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Managing the euro crisis has been a process of institutional transformation for the EU. The 
European Semester has emerged as a powerful tool for economic policy coordination 
between the Member States. Beyond the new enforcement tools that the Semester affords 
the Commission and Council in case of non-compliance with country-specific 
recommendations, the management of the crisis has given the Commission experience in 
structural reforms. The Commission now regularly uses this experience in formulating its 
yearly country-specific recommendations to Member States. Far from a stalwart of 
untethered neoliberalism, the Commission has been fashioning itself as the manager with 
a human face, the institution that understands both the structural reform requirements for a 
global economy, and the special need for strong social institutions that could shield 
European citizens from the worst of the shocks provoked by globalized markets. Hence the 
name, “Structural Reforms 2.0,” per the Juncker Commission.1 
 
In this chapter, I review the Commission’s emerging structural reform “know-how,” 
as represented in its latest reflection papers and European Semester documents. The 
European Commission seems to have drawn from its experience in managing loan 
conditionality for debtor countries like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, in order to come up 
with the set of structural reforms that it considers necessary for any country to thrive within 
the context of the euro. At the same time, it has taken on board the critiques of structural 
reforms that point to the potentially negative short-term effects of structural adjustment. 
Thus, the Commission seems to have fully embraced the idea of the EU as a soft alternative 
to unfettered globalization and has taken it upon itself to monitor certain aspects of the 
welfare state in Member States.  
 
The Commission’s recommendations, however, while presented in the mode of 
technocratic expertise, entail deeply political choices in almost every imaginable regulatory 
field. Despite constant assurances that there is no “one-size fits all” model for structural 
reforms, what is shaping up through the European Semester is effectively a list of desirable 
reforms—a set menu of options—which the Commission now openly characterizes as “EU 
best practices.” If applied, they would provoke deep restructurings and adjustments of 
national political economies with winners and losers to boot. These demands for deep 
restructurings are couched in a language of technical adjustment and fine-tuning that does 
not do justice to the qualitative reform required of the Member States nor to the substantive 
trade-offs between market efficiency and social fairness that only a democratic process can 
legitimize. Contrary to some observers, I conclude that the inclusion of social policy goals 
into the European Semester can be an indication of both the success of socially minded 
actors in influencing the content of macroeconomic governance, and of the success of 
                                                        
1 Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner European Commission, Speech Structural Reforms 2.0: For a Stronger 
and More Inclusive Recovery, SPEECH/16/2124 (June 9, 2016). 
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market-minded actors in adapting to demands for “social fairness” in macroeconomic 
governance without ceding much space in terms of the kinds of reforms required. Much of 
this “socialization” of the European Semester will depend on how the rest of the 
management of the common currency evolves. 
 
 
I. Background to the Coordination of Member State Economic Policies 
 
The Maastricht Treaty infamously introduced the idea of the common currency without 
establishing a common EU-wide economic policy. At the insistence of Germany, Member 
States adopted the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was meant to commit Member 
States to budgetary and fiscal restraint. 2  More specifically, Member States agreed to 
maintain their budget deficit to under 3% of their GDP and their debt to under 60% of their 
GDP. The Treaties specified a mechanism of multilateral surveillance of state economic 
policies, aimed at ensuring respect of the SGP, the so-called ‘preventive arm’ of the SGP. 
More specifically, the Council, on the basis of a Commission proposal would set broad 
guidelines on economic policy that the Member States should respect. It would then 
monitor Member State adherence to those guidelines based on reports submitted by the 
Commission. The Council could address specific recommendations to Member States if it 
thought that the Member State’s economic policy deviated from the broad guidelines.3  
  
In addition to the ‘preventive arm’ of this process of multilateral surveillance, the 
Treaties provided for a ‘corrective arm,’ which was meant to induce compliance with 
budgetary and debt limits. The Commission would decide whether a specific Member State 
was in violation of the budget and debt limit criteria of the SGP. In other words, it would 
decide whether there was an excessive deficit or a Member State was close to running an 
excessive deficit and make a relevant recommendation to the Council. The Council would 
then address recommendations to the Member State in question, suggesting measures to 
bring the deficit situation under control. The specific efforts of the Member State to correct 
the deficit would be monitored. If the Member State failed to respond to Council 
recommendations, the Council could resort to a number of more coercive strategies such 
as requiring the Member State to make a non-interest bearing deposit with the Union until 
the problem was corrected, or, in the last resort, impose fines of an “appropriate size.”4 
 
                                                        
2 The legal basis for the SGP can be found in the Treaties (now Articles 121 and 126 of the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, October 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 
[hereinafter TFEU]). Its content was specified in two Regulations and one Council Resolution. See Council 
Regulation 1466/97, On the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance 
and Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1; Council Regulation 1467/97, On Speeding up 
and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6; Council 
Resolution, On the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 1. For the particularly important role that 
the governments of Germany and the Netherlands played in the adoption of the SGP see Martin Heipertz 
and Amy Verdun, “The Dog that Would Never Bite? What We Can Learn from the Origins of the Stability 
and Growth Pact,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 5 (2004): 756-80.  
3 Article 121 TFEU. 
4 Article 126 TFEU. 
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The SGP and its preventive and corrective arms were fiercely debated in the relevant 
literature with critics arguing both that the pact was too ‘inflexible’ in imposing a 
numerically fixed limit to budget and debt deficits, and that it was too ‘soft’ or 
‘ineffective.’5 The implementation of the multilateral surveillance seemed to vindicate the 
latter critique. Between 2001-2003, several Member States were found to be in violation 
of the SGP; however, no sanctions were imposed, and after a vote from a divided Council, 
the excessive deficit procedure was put in abeyance for France and Germany, despite the 
fact that neither state had complied. 6  The SGP Regulations were reformed in 2005, 
introducing further flexibility in the application of the excessive deficit procedure.7 
  
The ideological tides started changing against flexibility and in favor of stricter 
enforcement after the Greek crisis, which transformed into a euro crisis, starting in 2010. 
Whatever one may think about the origins and causes of the crisis, there was little doubt 
that Greece’s debt burden had exposed it to the pressures of international markets, which 
in turn had affected other Eurozone Member States. This reinforced the consensus around 
the need for stricter oversight of Member State economic policy by the EU. This translated 
into a series of measures embodied in the so-called ‘Six Pack’ and ‘Two Pack’ adopted 
between 2011 and 2013.8 In addition, twenty-five Member States adopted the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination, and Governance in 2012, which commits them to a balanced 
budget.9  
  
Perhaps the most important change brought about by the post-2010 package of new 
measures is the creation of the European Semester, described by the Council as “a cycle of 
economic and fiscal policy coordination” aimed at ensuring “convergence and stability in 
the EU,” “sound public finances” and fostering of economic growth. 10  Each year in 
December, the Commission analyzes the economic situation and publishes an “Annual 
Growth Survey” (AGS) in preparation for the upcoming European Semester. Between 
January and July, the Council reviews the AGS and after obtaining the opinion of the 
European Parliament adopts its conclusions on the AGS. The European Council then 
proposes guidelines based on this process. The second phase of the European Semester 
includes a review of the specific policies of individual Member States. Each Member State 
                                                        
5 See generally Heipertz and Verdun, “The Dog that Would Never Bite?”; Jakob de Haan et al., “Why Has 
the Stability and Growth Pact Failed?,” International Finance 7, no. 3 (2004): 235-60; Jürgen von 
Hagen, “Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland: Experiences with the Stability and Growth Pact.” 
Working Paper no. B 06-2003, ZEI, Center for European Integrations, 2003, 1-35.  
6 See generally Heipertz and Verdun, “The Dog that Would Never Bite?,” 765.  
7 Jean-Victor Louis, “The Review of the Stability and Growth Pact,” Common Market Law Review 43, no. 1 
(2006): 85-106. 
8  The Six Pack consisted of five Regulations and one Directive, while the Two Pack included two 
Regulations. The most important reforms included an intensification of the ex-ante surveillance of economic 
policy and the introduction of the potential for the imposition of ex-post fines in cases of violation. See 
Council of the EU, “European Semester: A Guide to the Main Rules and Documents,” November 10, 2017, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-semester/european-semester-key-rules-and-
documents/.  
9 Daniel Gros, “The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(aka Fiscal Compact).” Working Document, Centre for European Political Studies, March 8, 2012. 
10 Council of the EU, “European Semester: Overview,” March 14, 2018, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-semester/.  
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submits a report on its proposed policies and budget. The Commission then publishes 
country-specific recommendations on the basis its own review, which are then adopted by 
the Council. Member States then take these recommendations into consideration before 
discussing their national budgets.  
  
Running parallel to the review of economic policies, the European Semester also 
includes a review of each Member State’s macroeconomic position. This process is the heir 
to the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP. A review of a certain number of 
macroeconomic indicators, result in a judgment about whether a Member State is in 
macroeconomic imbalance. The Commission incorporates the macroeconomic imbalance 
analysis in its country-specific recommendations and the Council in turn adopts them. 
Member States are expected to comply with those recommendations in deciding their 
national budgets. The barrage of measures included in the Six Pack and Two Pack after the 
2010 crisis include the possibility for the automatic imposition of fines in cases of Member 
State non-compliance with the country-specific recommendations. Thus far, this possibility 
has only been mobilized once, against Spain, on the rather technical basis that the statistics 
provided by one of its provinces were inaccurate.11  
 
The European Semester has imposed a certain European “timing” to national 
budgetary processes that would otherwise differ widely from one another. As Nicolas 
Jabko observes in his contribution to this volume, this shift in timing is of symbolic 
importance, signaling a new, “practice of sovereignty,” and one that accepts more intrusion 
on national budgets from the EU level.12 The European Semester has also brought about a 
renewed emphasis on structural reforms, imagined as the main way in which Member 
States can alter basic features of their economic performance with the goal of achieving 
better growth and “convergence” at the EU level. The structural reform recommendations 
of the Council, as proposed by the Commission, can give us a picture of the kind of 
economy imagined as ideal by EU experts. A careful reading of the latest round of such 
recommendations allows us to observe the emergence of certain types of structural reforms 
as desirable for most Member States, as well as a certain degree of carry-over from the 
‘know-how’ the Commission developed in managing the bail-out agreements of Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal.  
  
While the effectiveness of the European Semester has been highly doubted in the 
relevant literature, I believe it still carries a great deal of weight, especially since it seems 
to have solidified the Commission’s claimed expertise in structural reforms, which in turns 
is shaping what the Commission has referred to as “European best practices.” 13  The 
acceptance of these proposed structural reforms may differ from Member State to Member 
State depending on many factors, the most important of which perhaps is the Member 
                                                        
11 See discussion infra. 
12 Nicolas Jabko, “Politicized Integration: The Case of the Eurozone Crisis,” this volume. 
13 Memorandum of Understanding Between the European Commission Acting on Behalf of the European 
Stability Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece (August 2015), 5, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/01_mou_20150811_en1.pdf (“Greece will design and implement a 
wide range of reforms in labour markets and product markets (including energy) that not only ensure full 
compliance with EU requirements, but which also aim at achieving European best practices”).  
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State’s fiscal and economic position.14 The other important innovation post-crisis is the 
creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), whose funds could potentially be 
accessed by Member States in distress, only upon condition of compliance, however, with 
proposed reforms, which are designed by the European Commission, in coordination with 
the European Central Bank and, where needed, the International Monetary Fund.15 Thus, 
Member States that may feel more exposed to the vagaries of international markets because 
of their fiscal positions, will experience more pressure to comply with proposed structural 
reform recommendations. Unsurprisingly, Germany has felt no impulse to comply with the 
European Semester recommendations on its persistent surplus, which is thought to impede 
the adjustment of debtor Member States.16  
 
Finally, the corpus of Commission-endorsed structural reforms is currently one of the 
most important sites of discursive contestation between those who would like to see the 
EU take a more ‘social’ turn and those who believe that European welfarism lies at the 
heart of the EU’s current economic woes. The twists and turns of the “social,” therefore, 
within the European Semester are worth following and analyzing. 
 
 
II. From One-Size-Fits-All to Adaptable Convergence? 
 
The European Commission has produced a voluminous literature in the last eight years in 
the course of managing the euro crisis and the loan agreements between Eurozone members 
and debtor countries. 17  In addition, it now has several years of European Semester 
                                                        
14  Mark Hallerberg et al., “How Effective and Legitimate is the European Semester? Increasing the Role of 
the European Parliament.” Bruegel Working Paper no. 2011/09, September 2011, 23 (“As   to   its   
effectiveness, the   preliminary   evidence   is   that   countries   have   adapted   differently to the new 
procedures depending on whether they are 'old' or 'new' Member States; if their economic interests lie 
exclusively with the EU or not; and if they have strong or weak national fiscal frameworks.”) 
15 “Lending toolkit,” European Stability Mechanism website, last visited October 24, 2018, 
https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/lending-toolkit. For scholarly treatment of the European 
Commission’s role in the ESM see Michael W. Bauer and Stefan Becker, “The Unexpected Winner of the 
Crisis: The European Commission’s Strengthened Role in Economic Governance,” Journal of European 
Integration 36, no. 3 (2014): 213-29. 
16 European Commission Staff Working Document: Country Report Germany 2017, SWD (2017) 71 final 
(February 22, 2017), 1-2. 
17 Greece has received financial assistance on three different occasions. The first bailout agreement in 2010 
was between Greece, Eurozone Member States and the International Monetary Fund, as was the second one 
in 2012. In 2015 Greece received a financial assistance package from the recently created European Stability 
Mechanism. The European Commission has been in charge of supervising implementation of all these 
programs on behalf of the Eurozone creditors. Besides the basic agreement on the conditionality of these 
programs, which was encapsulated in Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), each one of these programs had 
several rounds of review with voluminous reports on compliance. For a comprehensive list of all the major 
publications produced in the process of this supervision, see “Financial Assistance to Greece,” European 
Commission website, last visited July 6, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-
and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-
assistance/financial-assistance-greece_en#financial-assistance-programmes. For the documents generated in 
the case of the Irish bailout, see “Financial Assistance to Ireland,” European Commission website, last visited 
July 6, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-
financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-ireland_en; for 
Portugal, see “Financial Assistance to Portugal,” European Commission website, last visited July 6, 2018, 
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coordination under its belt.18  The country-specific recommendations for the European 
Semester allow us to draw conclusions about the kinds of reforms the Commission believes 
are needed for successful economic governance within the EMU. Tracing the evolution of 
recommended reforms to their latest iteration suggests that far from treating Greece and 
other bailout countries as an extreme and rare case of macroeconomic instability, the 
Commission is drawing conclusions about desirable reforms for potentially every member 
of the Eurozone from its experience as a manager of bailout conditionality.19 
 
The first thing to note is that the Commission has fully embraced the idea that there 
were structural defects in the design of the euro that led to a patchwork institutional 
response in the panicked, emergency follow-up to the crisis.20 In fact, the Commission goes 
as far as to acknowledge theories of sudden stoppage of liquidity in an incomplete 
monetary union, that is in a union without a lender of last resort.21 However, it steers clear 
of blaming the joining together of really disparate economies under one currency as a 
culprit, which is what theories of the Eurozone as a non-optimal currency area have tended 
to do. 22  Instead, the Commission points a finger to a combination of “pre-crisis 
imbalances” in Member States and a faulty institutional set-up in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), especially as regards supervision of the banking sector and 
guarantees that could function as a backstop in a liquidity crisis.23  This story of co-
production of the crisis then allows the Commission to emphasize that the reforms 
                                                        
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-
assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-portugal_en; for the case of 
Cyprus’s bailout see “Financial Assistance to Cyprus,” European Commission website, last visited July 6, 
2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-
financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-cyprus_en.  
18 The first round of the European Semester took place in 2011. See European Commission Memorandum 
MEMO/11/14, European Semester: A New Architecture for the New EU Economic Governance–Q&A 
(January 12, 2011). 
19 Institutionally, this is also exemplified in the transformation of the initially country-specific “Task Force 
for Greece” into the “Structural Reform Support Program.” The Task Force for Greece, staffed by a mix of 
Commission employees and Greek civil servants, was meant to provide technical assistance to the Greek 
state in its structural reform efforts and expedite the channeling and use of EU structural funds in the country. 
See José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, European Renewal–State of the 
Union Address 2011, SPEECH/11/607 (September 28, 2011). It seems to have inspired the newly established 
“Structural Reform Support Service” designed “to support Member States in the preparation, design and 
implementation of institutional, structural and administrative reforms.” See European Commission Press 
Release IP/18/4143, Commission Provides Support for a Further 32 Reform Projects in Greece (June 13, 
2018).  The new service places special emphasis on projects that improve governance, such as judicial reform 
and anti-corruption. See “Structural Reform Support Service,” European Commission website, last visited 
July 6, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-
programmes/overview-funding-programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en. 
20 Commission Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, COM (2017) 291 
(May 31, 2017), 9 (“shortcomings in the way the EMU responds to major shocks”); Commission Reflection 
Paper, COM (2017) 291, 17 (“the institutional architecture of the EMU is a mixed system...; many new rules 
or bodies were established in an ad hoc manner over time, often in response to emergencies”). 
21  Commission Reflection Paper, COM (2017) 291, 9 (“sudden stop in capital flows exposed the 
unsustainable debt and competitiveness gaps that had accumulated over time”). For an overview of the way 
in which a sudden stop in the flow of credit can transform a liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis, see Paul 
De Grauwe, “Managing a Fragile Eurozone,” CESifo Forum 2 (Summer 2011): 40. 
22 Paul De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union 12th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 24-54. 
23 Commission Reflection Paper, COM (2017) 291, 9.  
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necessary for fixing the institutional gaps at EU level are well underway, but since they are 
incomplete Member States should hurry to undergo the necessary reforms in order to avoid 
the production of further imbalances.  
 
During the first years of crisis management the Commission insisted on 
competitiveness gaps between Member States as a causal factor in the production of the 
crisis, and therefore insisted on recommending reducing labor costs to improve 
competitiveness.24 This strategy may very well have been one of the few tools available 
for inducing an adjustment in indebted Member States without the availability of a 
devaluation, but competitiveness in and of itself figured prominently as a goal in the first 
few years of the post-crisis European Semester.25 While competitiveness still figures in 
many of its country-specific recommendations, there seems to be new emphasis on the 
existence of persistent divergences between Member State in the post-crisis recovery and 
an appreciation of the negative effects of such divergences beyond the economy: 
 
wide gaps in growth…opened between a group of more vulnerable 
countries and the others, with significant social and political costs.26 
The Commission attributes these divergences to pre-existing country-specific 
weaknesses, which were hidden through the pre-crisis credit bubble—and this is as close 
as the Commission comes to acknowledging a contribution of the currency itself to the 
crisis. 27  Despite the fact that the Commission recognizes the pre-crisis economic 
convergence to be partly an artifact of the credit bubble illusion, its plans are geared 
towards producing the institutional conditions that will lead to “re-convergence.”28 Thus, 
it considers divergence between European economies bad for the overall project of 
European integration, especially in the current conditions of an institutional halfway house, 
where monetary policy has been devolved upwards to the EU, while economic policy 
remains under national control subject to European Semester coordination.29 
 
This brings us to the Commission’s idea of what needs to be done by every Eurozone 
Member State—not just the debtor states. The general idea is “structural reforms to 
modernise economies and make them more resilient to shocks.”30 This is judged necessary 
as despite institutional progress the structure of the EMU remains incomplete and it is 
                                                        
24 Commission Annual Growth Survey: Advancing the EU’s Comprehensive Response to the Crisis, COM 
(2011) 11 final (January 12, 2011), 2 (“price and cost competitiveness remain problematic…the EU needs to 
use this crisis to address decisively the issue of its global competitiveness”). 
25 Commission Annual Growth Survey, COM (2011) 11 final; Commission Annual Growth Survey 2012, 
COM (2011) 815 final (November 23, 2011), 3; Commission Annual Growth Survey 2013, COM (2012) 750 
final (November 28, 2012), 3; Commission Annual Growth Survey 2014, COM (2013) 800 final (November 
13, 2013), 3. 
26 Commission Reflection Paper, COM (2017) 291, 10. 
27 Commission Reflection Paper, 9, 12. 
28 Commission Reflection Paper, 12. 
29 Commission Reflection Paper, 7 (“As robust as it is today, the EMU remains incomplete. The ‘Monetary” 
pillar of the EMU is well developed, as illustrated by the role of the European Central Bank (ECB). However, 
the “Economic” component is lagging behind, with less integration at EU level hampering its ability to 
support fully the monetary policy and national economic policies”). 
30 Commission Reflection Paper, 13. 
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therefore crucially important for each Member State to have strong capacity to adapt to a 
potential future external shock. Thus, in the Commission’s view converging towards “more 
resilient economic and social structures” should be the goal for everyone.31  
 
Reaffirming its belief in the idea that the Single Market is a strong engine for 
convergence between European economies, the Commission prioritizes a deepening of the 
Single Market as the first step in the direction of re-convergence.32 The second step in the 
same process is a stronger economic coordination through the European Semester. There, 
the Commission envisages a more “binding convergence process” 33  that would focus 
substantively on: 
 
quality of public spending; investment in education and training; embracing 
more open and more competitive products and services markets, and creating 
fair and efficient tax and benefit systems.34  
 
A minimum of social standards should also be included in this convergence process 
and the entire enterprise should be reinforced with tighter surveillance mechanisms, 
according to the Commission.35 The real bite behind the monitoring of the convergence 
process seems to be the newly created link between progress on structural reforms and 
access to EU structural funds. More specifically, in order to access the funds for projects 
co-financed by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI) national governments 
need to address the country-specific recommendations addressed to them at the end of the 
European Semester.36 In its proposals on how to further deepen the EMU, the Commission 
proposes an outright shift towards imposing reforms as conditionality for accessing ESI 
funds in the future.37  
 
From a substantive perspective, the Commission has been working on better defining 
the scope of desirable structural reforms over the past eight years. In his speech on 
structural reforms, Commissioner Moscovici recently provided some more details as to the 
elements of structural reforms now considered necessary for all Member States. 38 
According to Moscovici, the “key word for structural reforms 2.0 is productivity.”  This 
implies deep restructuring of education and vocational training systems and it also requires 
continued emphasis on reforms of welfare regimes towards “flexicurity.”39 
                                                        
31 Commission Reflection Paper, 23. 
32 Commission Reflection Paper, 24. 
33 Commission Reflection Paper, 24. 
34 Commission Reflection Paper, 24. 
35 Commission Reflection Paper, 24. 
36 Commission Reflection Paper, 25. 
37 Commission Reflection Paper, 25.  
38 Moscovici, SPEECH/16/2124.  
39 Moscovici, SPEECH/16/2124. Flexicurity combines the concepts of security and flexibility and has been 
long considered by the Commission as the ideal model for European welfarism. The idea is to treat the labor 
market as the main engine of both growth for the country and income security for workers. A country that 
adopts a flexicurity model of welfare, would invest money in re-training and re-skilling unemployed workers 
so that they can return to the labor market as soon as possible. The flexicurity model is thought to stand in 
contrast with other models of welfarism that seek to simply provide a safe floor for workers’ incomes and 
that are increasingly believed to discourage return to labor markets. See Ton Wilthagen and Frank Tros, “The 
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Specific examples of how the Commission has operationalized these broad ideas about 
structural reform can be found in the country specific recommendations (CSRs) for each 
country in the last several years. A list of recommended reforms was helpfully summarized 
by Vice President Dombrovskis: 
 
At national level, structural reform encompasses a broad set of measures, 
such as labour market reform; upskilling and re-skilling working people of 
all ages so that their profiles fit the jobs on offer; shifting the tax burden 
away from labour, especially low paid labour; ensuring long term 
sustainability of social and pension systems; boosting investment in R&D, 
with an eye on both the quantity and quality; and improving the governance 
and effectiveness of our public services.40 
 
Many elements on this list were present even before the crisis. Labor market reform 
still figures in many of the CSRs, and often focuses on reducing protections for permanent 
workers, which is thought to create labor market segmentation, in other words a sharp 
division between workers with permanent and workers with precarious contracts. Increased 
protections for workers are also believed to be problematic from the perspective of job 
creation.41 The Commission often still uses the language of “rigidities” in the labor markets 
to describe labor protections.42  It also continues to look suspiciously at minimum wage 
regulations, as potentially increasing workers’ reservation wages and therefore their 
willingness to take up new jobs.43 
 
Other elements such as the improvement of governance have made an appearance after 
the crisis and now regularly include items that fall well beyond the EU’s competences such 
as taxation and judicial reform. The evaluation of governance now reads like an 
International Monetary Fund assessment in that it leaves out very little outside of the scope 
                                                        
Concept of ‘Flexicurity’: A New Approach to Regulating Employment and Labour Markets,” European 
Review of Labour and Research 10, no. 2 (2004): 166-86. 
40  Valdis Dombrovskis, European Commission Vice-President, Speech at the Conference on Structural 
Reforms to Encourage Investment and Growth (March 3, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/dombrovskis/announcements/vp-dombrovskis-
speech-conference-structural-reforms-encourage-investment-and-growth_en.  
41 Commission Annual Growth Survey 2017, COM (2016) 725 final (November 16, 2016), 10 (“Those 
Member States that pursued comprehensive labour market and social protection reforms prior to the crisis 
have been better able to support employment and preserve fairness during the economic downturn. Such 
reforms encompass flexible and reliable contractual arrangements that promote labour market transitions and 
avoid a two-tier labour market”). 
42 Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2017 National Reform Programme 
of Portugal and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of Portugal, COM (2017) 
521 final (May 22, 2017), 3-5. 
43 Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation, COM (2017) 521 final, 6 (acknowledging 
the benefits of the minimum wage for the purposes of avoiding in-work poverty, but emphasizing the risks 
entailed for the low-skilled); Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2017 
National Reform Programme of France and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme 
of France, COM (2017) 509 final (May 22, 2017), 6 (“in the current context of high unemployment, there 
are risks that the cost of labour at the minimum wage hampers employment opportunities for low skilled 
people”). 
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of desirable reform. While there is very little that can be done at EU level to induce 
countries to comply with recommendations that fall beyond the macroeconomic imbalance 
procedure, the Commission has created a new “carrot” for countries undertaking such 




III. Preliminary Observations on “Structural Reforms 2.0” 
 
The Commission’s recommendations for the types of reforms needed by Member States 
suggest that it has moved away from the emergency emphasis on quick adjustments via 
labor cost cuts and towards a broader idea about what kinds of reforms would be conducive 
to growth. Despite the Commission’s repeated declarations about how there is no such 
thing as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model, what emerges from the post-crisis literature it has 
produced is a very consistent emphasis on transforming every European country into an 
outward-looking, export-based economy. In addition, the Commission has a checklist of 
reforms that will be needed to achieve this result. That checklist continues to revolve 
around items that were already in the Commission’s recommendations even before the 
crisis struck, namely, the deepening of the single market through liberalization of labor, 
service, and product markets, along with the transformation of European welfare regimes 
from factors of labor inactivity, to factors of labor activation.  
 
In other words, a belief in liberalizing markets as an engine of growth in and of itself 
is still very much present in the Commission’s recommendations, despite acknowledgment 
that said processes did not produce the desired upward “convergence” of European 
economies, except briefly through the operation of the credit bubble. A newly acquired 
emphasis on turning countries into globally competitive export engines begs the question 
of how exactly this will be achieved, given the truly gaping chasms in productive capacities 
between the different Member States and the traditional reliance of debtor and creditor 
states within the EU on trade between themselves as an engine for growth.  
 
What seems to have changed through the crisis years is the list of areas that can be 
included in the broad category of structural reforms. The experience of crisis management 
seems to have expanded the checklist of reforms considerably. The Commission now 
regularly delves deeply into tax and social security regimes in its yearly recommendations, 
as well as into the catch-all category of the efficiency of public administration, which 
includes anything from judicial reform to using generic drugs to cut expenses in public 
health systems to improving the connections between educational systems and industry. 
This might be why the Commission insists that there is no one-size-fits-all model in its 
recommendations. Every country has a different mix of items on the checklist that need 
urgent action so each CSR includes different actionable items. It is still true, however, that 
the big picture is one of the Commission pushing Member States to adopt reforms that it 
thinks will allow them to become export-based economies, hopefully of high-tech product 
and services.  
 
                                                        
44 See supra note 19. 
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The other big difference between early post-crisis recommendations and more recent 
ones is the increased emphasis on the social aspects of the economy. The Juncker 
Commission prominently advertises the inclusion of social fairness as a goal of the 
economic convergence process, talking more broadly about “economic and social 
divergence” as a problem.45 It also touts the inclusion of social indicators in the yearly 
monitoring process of the European Semester as an indication that the EU now puts 
economic considerations on par with social ones.46 Some academic observers have taken 
these developments as an indication of the flexibility of the European Semester as an 
economic governance tool that is able to accommodate goals of economic adjustment and 
growth with more social goals of ensuring social fairness in growth (or in crisis).47  
 
This warrants a few preliminary observations. The first one is that the flexibility of 
the European Semester can go both directions and it still quite early to make a judgment 
about whether the inclusion of “social” language is, in fact, a step forward, a step backward, 
or none of the above for those who care about the concept of a Social Europe. This is partly 
because much depends on what will happen next in the rest of the governance structure of 
the EMU. It may very well be that the Commission aspires to a deepening of the EMU that 
includes redistribution at EU level—, some proto EU-level welfare state. However, the 
politics of the Member States currently make this a highly unlikely event in the short to 
middle term. If it turns out to be true that all we can see in the next several years is 
management of an incomplete EMU, which by definition necessitates fiscal prudence and 
a switch to export-led growth for all Member States, without the capacity for more EU-
level redistribution, then the emphasis on the “social” in the European Semester is likely 
to serve the purpose of merely ensuring that “economic and social priorities are sustainable 
and work hand in hand.”48  In other words, the emphasis here is on the sustainability of the 
welfare regimes given the needs for fiscal prudence in the face of structural adjustment of 
productive models. 
 
This emphasis on sustainability in turn will mean countries will be pressured to 
converge towards flexible welfare models that emphasize adaptability of workers to 
changing circumstances and the provision of minimum standards to the neediest. While 
these may very well be worthy goals for a welfare regime to achieve, they entail highly 
contested political values, which cannot merely be adopted under the guise of technical 
necessity but need to be negotiated between the stakeholders at national level. One could 
argue that since Member States have already agreed to the euro, what its management 
necessitates should also be considered democratically legitimate. However, that would be 
a highly formalist and counterproductive approach to the problem, risking even worse 
backlash from various populist movements around the EU. While the European Semester 
has produced very mixed results on Member State compliance, the Commission is working 
diligently to develop not only the substantive ideas about what constitutes desirable reform 
                                                        
45 Commission Reflection Paper, COM (2017) 291, 12. 
46 Commission Reflection Paper, 33. 
47 Amy Verdun and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Introduction: The European Semester as a New Architecture of EU 
Socioeconomic Governance in Theory and Practice,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 
144 (“Semester provides a workable, if still imperfect framework for integrating EU social and economic 
policy co-ordination, without sacrificing the objectives of either process”). 
48 Commission Reflection Paper, COM (2017) 291, 10. 
 12 
in these fields, but also the tools necessary to gradually increase its capacity for 
enforcement. 
 
The Commission’s emphasis on what it considers an appropriate tax regime for 
properties is just one example of this newly acquired substantive “know-how” on structural 
reforms. Since the crisis, the Commission has been recommending a switch from 
transaction taxes on property, to recurrent property taxes. This made a first appearance in 
the Greek program, where the Troika, i.e. the Commission, the European Central Bank, 
and the International Monetary Fund, noted that the transaction tax on property affected 
labor mobility. The link is as follows: one-time transaction taxes on property make property 
more affordable, indeed Greece has one of the highest home ownership rates in Europe 
even after the crisis. People who own property are less likely to pick up and leave in order 
to go look for a new job elsewhere. In other words, owning property increases the 
reservation wage for the unemployed and decreases labor mobility. Therefore less home 
ownership is a worthy goal for reform in the case of Greece because it would improve labor 
mobility and therefore decrease unemployment rates. This is an astonishing proposal on 
the part of the institutions formerly known as the Troika, especially since at the time, 
Greece’s welfare regime had very little capacity to deal with the negative effects of the 
crisis and home ownership functioned as a social stabilizer in the absence of welfare 
rights.49  
 
The Commission’s theoretical commitment to recurrent property taxes as a more 
efficient tool is recently evident in the Commission’s Staff Working Paper on Spain’s 2017 
Country Report. The authors once again emphasize that recurrent property taxes “allow a 
more efficient allocation of assets, as well as higher labour mobility.” 50  The same 
recommendation can be found in Sweden’s 2017 CSRs, with the purpose of decreasing the 
levels of household indebtedness, presumably because fewer people would even try to buy 
with recurrent property taxes.51 One can find the same recommendation in Austria and 
Ireland’s CSRs as well, this time with the reasoning that it is a good way to increase tax 
revenue.52  
 
The point here is not that recurrent property taxes are wrong, or inefficient or 
undesirable. Rather the point is that they have now started to figure in the Commission’s 
recommendations regularly, and regardless of the country’s type of welfare regime. In the 
                                                        
49  Georgios Symeonidis et al., “Comparative Analysis of Poverty in Greece Versus Richer European 
Countries in the Debt-Crisis Era.” Working Paper no. 712, Luxembourg Income Study, August 2017, 15 
(“higher owned housing percentages for pensioners in Greece versus [other] countries seems to be one of the 
few alleviating factors in the lives of this group in the current crisis”). 
50 Commission Staff Working Document: Country Report Spain 2017, SWD (2017) 74 final (February 22, 
2017), 24. 
51 Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2017 National Reform Programme 
of Sweden and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 2017 Convergence Programme of Sweden, COM (2017) 
526 final (May 22, 2017), 5. 
52 Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2017 National Reform Programme 
of Austria and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of Austria, COM (2017) 519 
final (May 22, 2017), 5; Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2017 National 
Reform Programme of Ireland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of 
Ireland, COM (2017) 507 final (May 22, 2017), 5 [hereinafter Recommendation for Ireland].  
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case of Greece, which belongs to the Mediterranean style of welfarism, in which the family 
internalizes much of the cost of unemployment and other forms of economic dependency, 
high levels of debt-free home ownership allowed the country to weather a dramatic drop 
in its GDP with less homelessness than would otherwise have been possible. The road 
through which recurrent property taxes lead to more labor mobility per the creditors plans 
is through the eventual loss of home ownership by people who can no longer foot the tax 
bill, which in turn will naturally lead to better takeup of available low-paying jobs. In an 
economic environment that is still dire, moving forward with the recurrent property tax 
without the jobs waiting for the newly dispossessed is a risky gamble. In the case of 
Sweden, the recurrent property tax is suggested as a means of disincentivizing people from 
taking up mortgages. It is an entirely different context, in which the measure does not risk 
causing social harm, because the economic conditions are entirely different and the 
background welfare regime is Scandinavian-style welfarism that provides more than the 
minimum to more than the neediest. In the cases of Austria and Ireland, the measure is 
recommended as a better way to raise tax revenue, without any discussion at all of the 
potential unintended social consequences. In all cases, these measures, with huge 
distributional consequences for different groups of stakeholders are proposed as merely 
technical improvements on “governance,” without much consideration for the kind of 
democratic legitimation necessary for their adoption.  
 
Other examples include the Commission’s ideas about how to incentivize female labor 
participation. Those include providing full-day daycares and affordable childcare options, 
which are regularly included in the recommendations for countries showing low levels of 
female participation.53 But they also include more contested measures such as undoing the 
tax disincentives for the second wage earner to take up a job, when for example, the tax 
code provides for free health care insurance of a homemaker. In its 2017 recommendations 
to Germany, the Commission notes that free health care for a homemaker discourages her 
from taking up a job or increasing her hours worked in a part-time job.54 This is another 
example of a structural reform that is suggested on the basis of its importance for labor 
market participation, but it entails a very deep restructuring of the Member State’s welfare 
regime under the guise of a technical recommendation from an institution that now declares 
it cares equally about economic and social goals of convergence, and is taking steps to 
supervise both equally. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the 2015 Greek Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
repeatedly refers to reforming the Greek labor regime and welfare system according to “EU 
best practices.” This is further indication that the elaboration of the conditionality for 
indebted countries has served as a kind of laboratory in which the Commission has worked 
out its ideas about what counts as an EU best practice. In its section on a Greek “growth 
strategy” the MoU refers to structural reforms according to “European best practices” right 
before it describes how major assets should be privatized for more efficient use of 
                                                        
53 Recommendation for Ireland, COM (2017) 507 final, 6. 
54 Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2017 National Reform Programme 
of Germany and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of Germany, COM (2017) 
505 final (May 22, 2017), 6. 
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resources.55 Does the Commission as part of the institutions managing the Greek loan 
conditionality ascribe to privatization of public assets as a European best practice? It is 
unclear perhaps, but worrisome nonetheless in its presentation as a merely technocratic 
measure for better fiscal governance. If Greece achieves a restructuring of this magnitude 
in the midst of dire economic circumstances and without extra funding for the achievement 
of this goal, that is probably good news for the Commission, which will most likely have 
to push for similar reforms everywhere else, without the kind of spending capacity at EU 
level that would allow a sweetening of the pill. 
 
As far as Greece’s reform of its welfare regime goes, the MoU is unequivocal. There 
needs to be a fair sharing of the burdens of adjustment and that means creating a true safety 
net, which is in turn defined as attending to the needs of the poorest and the neediest.56 The 
MoU specifically mentions that this type of welfare regime would be in line with EU best 
practices. If the idea is that a welfare regime that attends to the needs only of the neediest 
is the goal for everyone, then we are again talking about a deep transformation of many 
welfare regimes around Europe, whether those are of the universalist or continental variant, 
both of which typically have included a certain level of de-commodification as their goal.57 
In other words, the welfare regime encapsulated in the MoU is, following Esping-
Andersen’s categorization, in the liberal mold, which requires citizens to turn to the market 
and commodify their labor in order to satisfy their basic needs, unless they fall in specific 
categories of extreme need or incapacity. A transformation of the Greek regime from the 
familialist provision of welfare to a minimum state-provided safety net for the neediest 
might prove to be a good thing—even though that’s also subject to debate—or at the very 
least something that many citizens will experience as an improvement over their prior 
situation. The de-commodification push in Scandinavian and continental regimes, 
however, is a different story, and probably not a move that is going to be well received. In 
all cases, we are talking about deep, extremely political transformations that are presented 
as a ‘best practice’ through a process in which the European Commission is an important 
actor. Even a cursory review of the CSRs shows that the Commission has put its years of 
managing debtor conditionality to use in developing a substantive body of reforms it 
considers desirable for every Member State.  
 
                                                        
55 Memorandum of Understanding Between the European Commission Acting on Behalf of the European 
Stability Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, 2 (“Greece will design and 
implement a wide range of structural reforms that not only ensure full compliance with EU requirements, but 
which also aim at achieving European best practices. The authorities will continue to implement an ambitious 
privatisation programme, and a new independent Privatisation and Investment Fund (HCAP) has been 
established supporting a more efficient use of resources”). 
56 Memorandum of Understanding, 18 (“A fairer society will require that Greece improves the design of its 
welfare system in line with EU best practices, so that there is a genuine social safety net which targets scarce 
resources to those in most need”). 
57  Esping-Andersen famously categorized welfare regimes into three ideal types; the universalist (like 
Sweden and other Scandinavian countries), the corporatist (like Germany) and the liberal (like the U.S.). 
Each regime entails different degrees of de-commodification and de-familialization. The concept of de-
commodification measures how much a state allows its citizens to be free from the pressure to sell their labor 
in the market in order to satisfy basic needs. De-familialization measures the degree to which a welfare 
regime allows individuals to be free from personal care obligations to other members of their family. See 
generally Gøsta Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). 
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This seems to be true even in domains that would seem to fall well outside of the 
European institutions’ purview such as the functioning of a Member State’s judicial 
regime. During the process of monitoring the conditionality of Greece’s latest loan—from 
the ESM this time—the Commission required Greece to create a “monitoring mechanism” 
for financial crimes, “including notably corruption and money laundering cases, with the 
objective to build a credible track-record of prosecuting and sanctioning such crimes.”58 
While any state might want to improve its record on corruption, a framework of European 
governance in which the national executive branch is urged to put pressure on its judiciary 
in order to satisfy the conditions that will lead to the disbursement of money from its 
European creditors, is politically problematic regardless what one may think of the 
substance. Lest someone think that this is Greek exceptionalism again, in Portugal’s 2017 
CSRs, the Commission commends the country’s efforts in the direction of fighting 
corruption through the judicial system.59 Nonetheless, it notes that “it remains to be seen 
whether [the improvements in numbers of prosecutions in corruption cases] will be 
reflected by improvements in final conviction rates.”60 In other words, the Commission is 
seen as taking a position on the substantive outcomes of judicial cases pending in front of 
the independent judiciary of a sovereign Member State. Tone deafness to political 
sensibilities is arguably another part of the Commission know-how that sometimes seems 
to carry over to the regular European Semester process from bailout program management. 
 
 
IV. Why do CSRs Matter Anyway? 
A plausible objection to these preliminary observations is that none of this really matters 
given that the preliminary empirical research on the effectiveness of the European Semester 
shows mixed results at best, and depends largely on the uptake of the proposed reforms by 
national actors.61 In other words, none of these critiques are really significant, if Member 
States can refuse to comply and if, in the end, it all boils down to national-level actors 
making decisions about which reforms they are or are not going to push through.  
 
First, one should note that the empirical evidence so far mostly comes from a study of 
the situation before the financial penalty against non-compliance had ever been used by the 
Commission. Second, the data on effectiveness pre-dates the adoption of Regulation 
1303/2013, which gives the Commission the possibility of conditioning the disbursement 
of structural funds to Member States on their compliance with CSRs.  
 
With respect to the first point, on the Commission’s recommendation, the Council 
adopted a financial penalty against Spain for a misrepresentation of regional statistics by 
                                                        
58 Greece: Technical Memorandum of Understanding Accompanying the MoU of the ESM Programme 
(March 2018), 45, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/tmu_3rd_review.pdf. 
59 See Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation, COM (2017) 521 final, 8. 
60 Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation, 8.  
61 Zsolt Darvas and Álvaro Leandro, “The Limitations of Policy Coordination in the Euro Area Under the 
European Semester,” Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/19, November 2015; Hallerberg et al., “How 
Effective and Legitimate is the European Semester?.” For an overview of the relevant literature see Verdun 
and Zeitlin, “Introduction: The European Semester as a New Architecture.” 
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Valencia in July 2015 as part of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).62 The fine was 
imposed on a country for a misrepresentation by one of its regions so it was not a penalty 
based on the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), but it does set a precedent. 
Despite the fact that this fine was set in the EDP rather than the MIP process, research 
shows that some of the actors involved in the European Semester, namely Commission 
officials and state representatives in the Council, may see the imposition of this fine as a 
precedent for the MIP as well.63 This seems to be why state officials through the Council 
then proceeded to object to the Commission’s proposal to include a number of “social” 
indicators in the regular scoreboard that serves as the baseline for assessing 
macroeconomic imbalances in the European Semester.64 State actors did not want the 
intrusive process of multilateral surveillance to go too deeply into employment and labor 
policy.65 The Commission, however, proceeded to do it, “because it is our choice” as one 
official apparently put it.66 In the mind of the actors directly involved then, the possibility 
of a fine to enforce CSRs even in areas such as employment and social indicators is not 
science fiction but a real possibility.  
 
On the second point, Regulation 1303/2013 gives the Commission the possibility to 
condition disbursement of structural funds on compliance with CSRs.67 In other words, this 
Regulation created a possibility for inserting a process of conditionality much like the one 
creditor countries were subject to as part of the loan agreements. The Commission refers 
to this possibility in its papers somewhat euphemistically (“closer linkage between national 
                                                        
62 European Council Press Release 581/15, Deficit Data in Valencia: Spain Fined for Misreporting (July 13, 
2015). 
63 See James D. Savage, “Enforcing the European Semester: The Politics of Asymmetric Information in the 
Excessive Deficit and Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure,” Draft paper, 24, 
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/0b987b53-9c28-493a-acb1-8018badb6e48.pdf.  
64 Savage, “Enforcing the European Semester,” 24 (“The Council, meanwhile, rejected the promotion of 
social indicators because they potentially exposed the member states’ economic and social policies to 
Commission programmatic intervention and fines”). 
65 Savage, “Enforcing the European Semester,” 21-22 (“What they don’t want is to take the risk to be fined 
for social issues”). The version of this draft paper that was published does not include the story of how the 
social indicators were adopted by the Commission see James D. Savage and David Howarth, “Enforcing the 
European Semester: The Politics of Asymmetric Information in the Excessive Deficit and Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedures,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 212-30.  
66 Savage, “Enforcing the European Semester,” 22. The European Parliament recently published a study about 
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and anti-poverty NGOs consulted expressed reservations about the process. They underlined that the role of 
social indicators in the Semester is “ambiguous” and complained that their consultation was very limited. 
See European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Mainstreaming Employment and Social 
Indicators into Macroeconomic Surveillance, IP/A/EMPL/2014-18 (February 2016), 44. The European Trade 
Union Confederation went as far as to say that the structural reforms promoted through the European 
Semester have undermined the European social model. See European Trade Union Confederation, “The 
ETUC Position on the Annual Growth Survey 2016–for a Europe that Works for Workers and Citizens,” 
October 28-29, 2015, https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/document/files/en-etuc-position-ags.pdf /.  
67  European Parliament and Council Regulation 1303/2013, Laying Down Common Provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and Laying Down 
General Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, 
2013 O.J. (L 347) 320. 
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reforms and existing EU funding”) but since 2016 CSRs all include a separate article that 
reminds Member States that Article 23 of Regulation 1303/2013 gives the Commission 
this prerogative. Admittedly, it is politically hard to envisage such an imposition even 
though a partial precedent has been set on the specific issue of misreported statistics. The 
literature so far cautions that ex-post conditionality, that is the proposal to suspend funding 
until a fiscal or macroeconomic imbalance has been corrected, will be almost impossible 
to properly monitor and enforce, while it will also cause tensions between Member States.68 
However, another reason to think that cohesion fund conditionality might someday become 
reality, is that its biggest proponent seems to be the German government, which is the 
biggest creditor in the context of an incomplete monetary union.69  
 
In summary, the objection that weak country-compliance renders some of the policy 
reforms in the CSRs irrelevant is becoming less sustainable in the face of the new 
enforcement mechanisms in place and the suggestion that they could be used. The 
probability of their use becomes even greater in a scenario where the EMU continues to 
lack the necessary tools to avert another crisis, such as a full banking union. Should another 
big crisis come along, the disbursement of ESM funds to Member States will surely be 
conditioned on compliance with suggested reforms; the content of these reforms will surely 
be influenced by the prior stages of crisis management. 
 
It is interesting to compare with developments in the area of rule-of-law conditionality. 
As Kim Scheppele’s and Dan Kelemen’s contribution to this book highlights, various 
proposals for imposing rule-of-law conditionality on structural fund access have been put 
forth in the cases of Hungary and Poland, but without success.70 Both of these countries 
have adopted a number of reforms that reinforce autocratic power in the executive arm. 
The Commission seems to be split on the desirability of such conditionality with President 
Juncker opposing it as “poison for the European continent.”71 From the perspective of the 
perceived legitimacy of the Union, a situation in which structural reforms can be imposed 
as conditionality for the purposes of macroeconomic and budgetary discipline but without 
the equivalent conditionality in the case of human rights violations, would be very 
problematic.  
 
This chapter’s analysis of developments in the European Semester as potentially 
negative for Social Europe stands somewhat at odds with recent research by Jonathan  
Zeitlin and Bart Vanhercke. 72  Zeitlin and Vanhercke observe that developments over the 
                                                        
68  Cinzia Alcidi and Daniel Gros, “How to Strengthen the European Semester?,” Centre for European 
Political Studies Research Report no. 2017/15, December 2017, 18-20; Robin Huguenot-Noël et al., “Can 
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Structural Funds Reconcile Growth, Solidarity and Stability Objectives?,” 16.  
70 Kim Lane Scheppele and R. Daniel Kelemen, “Defending Democracy in EU Member States: Beyond 
Article 7 TEU,” this volume, 17-21. 
71 Scheppele and Kelemen, “Defending Democracy in EU Member States,” 20. 
72 Jonathan Zeitlin and Bart Vanhercke, “Socializing the European Semester: EU Social and Economic Policy 
Co-ordination in Crisis and Beyond,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 149-74. 
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last several years have, if anything, ‘socialized’ the European Semester at the initiative of 
actors who are working on behalf of Social Europe. Their extensive surveys document the 
impressive expansion of CSRs to include social objectives and further show that this 
outcome was the result of collaborative processes of different actors within the 
Commission and different committees in the Council.  In this respect, it is worth noting 
that there is at least some indication that there was a certain degree of conflict in the process 
of “socializing” the European Semester; resistance came from Member State reluctance to 
allow the Commission to intrusively monitor the employment and social fields.73   
 
Moreover, even though the process might have become somewhat more inclusive, it 
is still true that the model of Social Europe that seems to predominate in the European 
Semester is one where the market is understood as the main motor for growth and 
prosperity and where social policy reforms are geared towards creating adaptable, 
employable workers who will turn to employment for meeting even their basic needs. As 
Mark Dawson observes, even social officials in the EU institutional structure seem to 
subscribe to a version of social policy as first and foremost a production factor rather than 
a tool for creating lives that are not entirely market dependent—an astonishing 
development that narrows the scope of Social Europe as previously understood.74  
 
This potential narrowing of the meaning of Social Europe reflects a broader EU 
institutional trend and comes about through a process mostly concentrated in the EU 
executive arm. As noted in Renaud Dehousse’s chapter, one of the hallmarks of the EU’s 
recent crises has been the empowerment of technocratic actors in the process of norm 
production. 75 Even if the executive itself is now subject to constraints coming from a 
multilateral surveillance process of relevant experts at national and EU level, it is not a 
process that seriously engages democratic deliberation. Verdun and Zeitlin document the 
increased participation of national representatives in the Council in the formulation of the 
CSRs and note that “much of the real debate” about the recommendations takes place in 
the dialogue between the Commission and the Council’s committees.76  They then take this 
development as an indication that “peer review by expert officials enhances rather than 
restricts the scope for democratic debate.” 77  Beyond the problems with equating the 
dialogue between national and supranational experts with democratic deliberation, this 
position overlooks the potential for the process of multilateral deliberation to become more 
coercive. Note that when the moment came for deciding whether social indicators were 
going to be included in the European Semester, national representatives in the Council 
opposed it, and the Commission proceeded to include them anyway, knowing very well 
that national representatives opposed it because they did not want close surveillance or 
potential fines imposed in the process.78  
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A last reason one might downplay the potentially negative effect of “the social” in 
CSRs is the launching of a “European Pillar of Social Rights” by the Commission in April 
2017.79 However, on this topic, I am in agreement with Sacha Garben’s estimation that 
while there are many promising aspects to the Social Pillar, it does not address the 
fundamental issue of the “displacement of the national and European legislative process in 
the two areas where the most important social decisions have been made in the EU during 
the past decade: the internal market and European economic governance.”80 Yet another 
illustration of the displacement of legislative politics in the social domain can be found in 
this chapter. The carryover of expertise from the loan agreements to the European 
Semester, with the identification of “EU best practices,” demonstrates how policy reforms 
with deep implications for welfare states are elaborated in the domain of economic 
governance, through the input of economic expertise. At the current stage, the multilateral 
surveillance mechanism incorporating a dialogue between national and supranational 
experts on the contested issues seems to have produced a renewed emphasis on Social 
Europe. In the process, however, the very concept has been redefined in a way that excludes 
options, a choice with profound consequences that instead should be decided through a 
genuine democratic engagement at the national and supranational levels. 
 
                                                        
79 Commission Recommendation on the European Pillar of Social Rights, C (2017) 2600 final (April 26, 
2017); Communication from the Commission, Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights, COM 
(2017) 250 final (April 26, 2017); European Parliament, European Commission, and Council of the 
European Union, European Pillar of Social Rights, November 17, 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/social-summit-european-pillar-social-rights-
booklet_en.pdf. 
80 Sacha Garben, “The Constitutional (Im)balance Between ‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in the European 
Union,” European Constitutional Law Review 13, no. 1 (2017): 23-61.  
